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Abstract 
This study examines whether new health information, obtained through medical 
screening, affects entitlements to Social Security benefits. Random assignment of information is 
derived from a unique feature of the Continuous National Health and Nutrition Examination 
Survey. To examine the effect of information on entitlements, the survey data are matched to 
administrative data from the Social Security Administration. The results suggest that new health 
information leads to delayed entitlements, particularly among workers near the early retirement 
age.  
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I. Introduction 
 It is generally presumed that poor health hastens retirement from the labor market, 
particularly among older workers.  This presumption is supported by numerous studies linking 
poor health to early retirement.1  To contribute to this literature, this study examines whether 
new health knowledge – obtained through medical screening – affects entitlements to Social 
Security benefits.  The study considers both Disability Insurance (DI) benefits, available to 
disabled workers, and Old-Age (OA) benefits, available to workers who are at least 62 years of 
age.  In contrast to much of the literature, the results from this study suggest that health 
information delays, rather than hastens, retirement. 
The main data for the study come from the National Health and Nutrition Examination 
Survey (NHANES).  Unlike other health surveys, the NHANES is designed to measure the 
prevalence of both diagnosed and undiagnosed conditions.  To do so, the survey first asks 
participants if they have ever been diagnosed with certain conditions, and then tests participants 
for these conditions by medical examination.  Importantly, the results of the medical exam are 
revealed to participants.  Participants who report that they had never been diagnosed with a 
particular condition, but who subsequently test positive for the condition through the survey’s 
medical exam, are assumed to have gained new information of their health status. 
Variation in new health information is obtained by exploiting a particular feature of the 
data collection process.  More precisely, medical exams were scheduled in either the morning or 
afternoon, but only three laboratory tests – plasma glucose, LDL (bad) cholesterol, and 
triglycerides – were administered to morning examinees.  This is because these three tests 
require fasting, which is best achieved overnight.  As a result, participants assigned to a morning 
exam received information about their plasma glucose, LDL cholesterol, and triglycerides levels, 
whereas respondents assigned to an afternoon exam were not.  To ensure the representativeness 
of morning examinees, exam time was assigned through sampling.  Therefore, the effect of 
knowledge on benefit entitlements can be measured as the difference in entitlements between 
exam groups. 
1 Such studies include Anderson and Burkhauser (1985), Bazzoli (1985), Bound (1991), 
Sammartino (1987), Rust (1989), Quinn, Burkhauser, and Meyers (1990); Rust and Phelan 
(1997); Coile et al. (2002); McGarry (2004); and Benitez-Silva and Dwyer (2005).  For a 
discussion, see Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999). 
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The sample is constructed by pooling NHANES data across survey years 1999/2000, 
2001/2002, and 2003/2004.  These surveys are merged to both restricted-use mortality files and 
Social Security administrative data.  The administrative data come from the Master Beneficiary 
Record, which reports entitlement information for both DI and OA.  (Unfortunately, the data do 
not contain information on Social Security covered earnings.)  The analysis is limited to 
participants who are matched to administrative data, who are not entitled to Social Security 
benefits prior to the survey, and who are ages 40 to 62 at the time of survey.  Entitlements are 
examined within two calendar years after the second calendar year of the survey. 
 The results suggest that new health knowledge leads to delays in benefit entitlements, 
particularly among older workers aged 59 to 62.  Among these workers, entitlement delays are 
evident for both the DI and OA program, and among male and female workers.  Delays are most 
pronounced among workers who are insured for DI benefits – an indicator of recent labor force 
attachment – and among workers who report having never been diagnosed with diabetes.  The 
results also suggest that new health knowledge increases labor supply, measured by an indicator 
of any earnings covered by Social Security. 
 The results from this study contrast with those from related studies, which generally 
conclude that poor health hastens retirement.  However, these studies raise a number of empirical 
concerns.  One concern is that the association between poor health and early retirement may be 
attributable to other factors, such as discount rates or preferences for work.  This is less of a 
concern in this study, as health information is randomly assigned.  Another concern is that 
individuals may use poor health to justify early retirement.  If so, studies that use subjective 
measures of health, such as self-reported health status or work limitations, may overstate the 
effects of health on retirement (Parsons, 1980, 1982; Bound, 1991).  This is less of a concern in 
this study, as health is measured objectively by the detection of latent medical conditions. 
 This study is most related to studies by McGarry (2004) and Benitez-Silva and Dwyer 
(2005).  They examine whether changes in health affect retirement expectations.  McGarry 
concludes that a deterioration of subjective health hastens expected retirement, but that a new 
report of “any” health condition has no discernible effect.  However, she does not examine 
changes in specific health conditions such as diabetes or high cholesterol, due to their rare 
occurrence in the sample.  Benitez-Silva and Dwyer, in contrast, do examine specific health 
conditions.  They find that a change in diabetes status delays expected retirement, which is 
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consistent with results of this study.  However, they do not address the potential endogeneity of 
changing diabetes status, which may lead to an omitted variables bias, and only examine 
retirement expectations, not retirement outcomes. 
One possible mechanism for the results is that the detection of a latent medical condition 
increases demand for health insurance coverage, and this demand encourages employment to 
obtain or retain employer provided health insurance.  This mechanism is especially apt for 
workers under the age of 65, who may not qualify for Medicare coverage.  This mechanism is 
supported by a recent study by Edwards (2013), who finds that screening for diabetes among the 
previously undiagnosed population improves health behaviors, such as increased physical 
activity and medication usage. 
This mechanism raises additional questions regarding when and how health information 
is collected over the life cycle.  Several studies show that, in regards to the detection of latent 
medical conditions, incentives matter.  Kubik (1999) shows that an expansion of Supplemental 
Security Income benefits for disabled children encouraged the detection and treatment of mental 
health conditions among children; Cullen (2003) finds that a change in supplement funding for 
schools to accommodate disabled children affected the percent of children defined as disabled; 
Thornton (2008) shows that monetary incentives affected the decision to learn about one’s HIV 
status; and Singleton (2009) shows that an expansion of disability benefits for Vietnam veterans 
with diabetes increased the prevalence and treatment of diabetes.  Understanding how health 
information is acquired over the life-cycle, and how this information affects economic outcomes, 
is an important area for further research. 
 
II. Data 
A. Continuous NHANES 
 The main source of data is the Continuous National Health and Nutrition Examination 
Survey (NHANES).  The survey is representative of the US population, excluding persons in 
nursing homes, members of the armed forces, institutionalized persons, or US nationals living 
abroad, and oversamples blacks, Mexican Americans, adolescents, and older persons.  The 
surveys are conducted annually, but the public-use data are pooled across two consecutive years.  
The first survey release covers years 1999 and 2000. 
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 A unique goal of the NHANES is to measure the prevalence of both diagnosed and 
undiagnosed medical conditions.  This goal is achieved in two stages.  In the first stage, survey 
participants answer questions regarding previous health diagnoses, as well as questions regarding 
their demographic characteristics, socioeconomic status, and dietary habits.  This stage occurs in 
the participant’s home.  In the second stage, survey participants undergo a medical examination, 
which includes physical assessments, dental assessments, and laboratory tests.  This stage occurs 
in a Mobile Examination Center (MEC), a medical clinic constructed from four mobile trailers 
and staffed by 17 medical personnel.  Importantly, all medical exams are performed after the at-
home interview, and 89.9 percent are performed within two months.2  For research purposes, 
medical conditions that are not reported during the at-home survey, but are subsequently 
revealed during the medical examination, are deemed undiagnosed. 
 Importantly, survey participants are notified of their medical exam results.  Results that 
are immediately available – such as physical measurements, blood pressure, and dental 
assessments – are provided, in printout form, upon exiting the MEC.  Results that are not 
immediately available are reported to participants by mail, usually within 12 to 16 weeks after 
the medical exam.  If the exam identifies a condition that requires medical attention, the MEC 
physician may offer to contact the participant’s physician, or recommend a physician, for follow-
up care.  However, according to survey documentation, no clinical treatments or interventions 
are provided by MEC personnel. 
The goal of this study is to determine whether new health information – obtained through 
medical screening – affects entitlements to Social Security benefits.  To obtain variation in health 
information, the analysis exploits the fact that three laboratory tests – plasma glucose, LDL (bad) 
cholesterol, and triglycerides – were only administered to morning examinees.  This is because 
these three tests require fasting, which is best achieved overnight.  To ensure the 
representativeness of morning examinees, half of survey participants were randomly assigned, 
through sampling, to a morning examination. 
Because of the three additional tests, morning examinees were offered more information 
about their health status than afternoon examinees.  The test of plasma glucose measures sugar in 
the blood and is used to diagnose diabetes.  The test of LDL cholesterol measures bad cholesterol 
2 This lag is determined from the public-use data by comparing the age in months at the 
interview to the age in months at the time of the exam. 
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in the blood, and the test of triglycerides measures fat in the blood.  Both tests are used to 
determine risk factors for a heart attack or stroke.   
It should be noted that, although tests of LDL cholesterol and triglycerides were only 
administered to morning examinees, both groups were tested for  total cholesterol and HDL 
(good) cholesterol, as these tests do not require fasting.  Moreover, high total cholesterol and low 
HDL cholesterol are correlated high LDL cholesterol and triglycerides.  This means that, 
although afternoon examinees were not directly tested for LDL cholesterol or triglycerides, they 
may update their belief about LDL cholesterol and triglycerides based on other test results.  
Thus, the most salient difference in health information between morning and afternoon 
examinees is knowledge of diabetes. 
B. Social Security Administration Files 
 The Continuous NHANES are matched to SSA administrative data.  SSA data are 
available for survey years 1999/2000, 2001/2002, and 2003/2004.  For this study, SSA 
information is limited to select variables from the Master Beneficiary Record (MBR), which 
contains information regarding Social Security’s DI, OA, and Survivor programs.  The variables 
include the type and date of initial entitlement and the type and date of current entitlement.  
Current entitlement is measured at the end of calendar year 2008, the last year for which SSA 
data are available. 
B. Mortality Files 
 The Continuous NHANES is also matched to mortality information from death certificate 
records, provided by the National Center for Health Statistics.  For this study, mortality 
information is limited to the date of death.  This information is available through calendar year 
2006. 
 
III. Sample and Summary Characteristics 
A. NHANES Sample 
 The sample is constructed by pooling NHANES data across survey years 1999/2000, 
2001/2002, and 2003/2004, for which data on SSA entitlements and mortality are available.  
Before deriving the sample specific to the analysis, it is useful to show that treatment and 
comparison groups are similar among the full NHANES sample.  For this purpose, the sample is 
restricted to respondents who are ages 20 and older (49.3 percent) and who have completed a 
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MEC exam (95.5 percent).  This sample contains 14,213 observations, 48.9 of whom are 
assigned to a morning exam. 
 The left panel of Table 1 presents demographic characteristics.  Estimates are presented 
separately for morning and afternoon examinees, and the differences between exam groups are 
reported in the third column. As shown, morning and afternoon examinees are similar in regards 
to age, race, educational attainment and marital status.  All estimated differences are small and 
statistically insignificant.   
The left panel of Table 2 presents various rates of self-reported health conditions 
collected during the at-home survey.  Listed first are health conditions relevant to this study: 
diagnosed diabetes (including and excluding borderline diagnoses) and high cholesterol.  As 
shown, the rates of previously diagnosed diabetes are similar between exam groups, but the rate 
of high cholesterol is 1.6 percentage points (standard error: 0.7) higher among morning 
examinees.  While statistically significant, the difference is small relative to the overall average 
of 26.5 percent.  In regards to the other health conditions – including high blood pressure, 
arthritis, and overweight – most differences are small and statistically insignificant.  One notable 
exception is arthritis, which is 2.0 percentage points (standard error: 0.7) higher among morning 
examinees. 
The left panel of Table 3 reports results from laboratory tests and examinations.  The first 
set of results is from laboratory tests that were only administered to morning examinees: plasma 
glucose, LDL cholesterol, and triglycerides.  The results from the laboratory tests were translated 
into diagnostic categories using the medical definitions given in Appendix Table 1.  As shown, 
more than one third of the sample is diagnosed with at least borderline diabetes, borderline high 
cholesterol, and borderline high triglycerides.  The other estimates in the table are from 
laboratory tests and examinations administered to both exam groups: total cholesterol, HDL 
cholesterol, high blood pressure, and body mass index.  As shown, diagnostic rates from these 
tests are similar among both groups.  One exception is at least borderline high cholesterol, which 
is 2.1 percentage points (standard error: 0.9) lower among morning examinees. 
Overall, most of the estimated differences between examination groups are small and 
statistically insignificant, which supports the claim of random assignment.  The few notable 
differences are likely attributable to sampling error. 
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B. Analysis Sample 
 The analysis sample is derived for the specific purposes of this study.  First, by necessity, 
the sample is restricted to survey respondents who are matched to Social Security administrative 
records.  This criterion depends on whether the respondent consented to the match.  Among the 
NHANES sample described above, the match rate is 85.7 (standard error: 0.4) and 84.7 (standard 
error: 0.4) percent among morning and afternoon examinees, respectively. 
Second, the sample is restricted to survey respondents who are not entitled to DI or OA 
benefits prior to the first calendar year of the survey.  For example, respondents in the 1999/2000 
survey are dropped from the sample if entitled to benefits on or before the end of 1998.  
Conditional on being matched to SSA data – the first sample criterion above – the percent of 
respondents who are not already entitled to benefits is 74.4 (standard error: 0.6) and 73.9 
(standard error: 0.6) percent among morning and afternoon examinees, respectively.   
It is important to note that the percent of respondents who are not already entitled to 
benefits varies by sex and survey age.  This point is illustrated in Figure 1.  As shown, the 
percent declines steadily from age 20 to 62, reflecting increasing rates of DI entitlement across 
these ages.  The percent falls precipitously from 62 to 63, due largely to OA entitlements at the 
normal retirement age of 62.  The percent drops again at age 66, but only among males, which 
reflects entitlements to OA benefits at the normal retirement age of 65.3 
The reason the percent falls at 63, rather than 62 – and 66, rather than 65 – is due to the 
definition of entitlement and the timing of the survey.  In particular, because the survey is 
conducted over two calendar years, a respondent’s age at the end of a calendar year is not known 
precisely, and could be one of three possible ages.  For example, a respondent who reports an age 
of 62 during the 1999/2000 survey could be 60, 61, or 62 by the end of calendar year 1998.  
Thus, only a fraction of respondents who are age 62 at the time of the survey are eligible for OA 
benefits prior to the survey. 
Based on this Figure 1, the third and last sample criterion pertains to age: respondents are 
dropped from the sample if they are younger than 40 or older than 62.  Below 40, entitlement 
rates are low, so estimated differences in entitlements would be precise.  And above 62, 
3 The normal retirement age is 65 for individuals born in 1938 or earlier.  The normal retirement 
age increases by 2 months for each annual birth cohort from 1939 to 1943, reaching 66 for birth 
cohorts 1943 to 1954. 
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entitlement rates are high, which would raise concerns for both small samples and sample 
selection.  The percent of the sample ages 40 to 62 is 43.0 (standard error: 0.8) and 44.0 
(standard error: 0.7) percent among morning and afternoon examinees, respectively.  The final 
sample contains 1925 morning examinees and 1977 afternoon examinees. 
Because the analysis sample is a subset of the full sample, it is again necessary to 
establish that treatment and comparison groups are comparable.  Summary statistics for the 
analysis sample are presented in the right panels of Tables 1, 2, and 3.  As shown, most of the 
estimated differences between morning and afternoon examinees are comparable.  Notable 
exceptions are survey age (Table 1), previously diagnosed arthritis (Table 2), previously 
diagnosed emphysema (Table 2), and at least borderline high cholesterol, determined by the 
medical exam (Table 3).  These differences are likely attributable to sampling error. 
The extent of additional health information conveyed to morning examinees is given by 
Table 3.  Roughly forty percent of morning examinees are diagnosed with at least borderline 
diabetes, borderline high LDL cholesterol, and borderline high triglycerides.  Excluding 
borderline cases, 11.0 percent are diagnosed with diabetes, 15.8 percent are diagnosed with high 
LDL cholesterol, and 21.3 percent are diagnosed with high triglycerides.  Some examinees are 
diagnosed with two or more of these conditions, so that, excluding borderline cases, 36.5 percent 
of morning examinees are diagnosed with diabetes, high LDL cholesterol, or high triglycerides. 
Mentioned above, afternoon examinees were not directly tested for diabetes, LDL 
cholesterol, or triglycerides, but they may update their beliefs about these conditions based on 
information on total cholesterol and HDL cholesterol.  To determine whether this is possible, 
rates of diabetes and high LDL cholesterol were calculated across three categories of total 
cholesterol – normal, borderline high, and high – using only morning examinees.  As expected, 
total cholesterol appears to be a strong predictor of high LDL cholesterol: across the three 
categories, the prevalence of high LDL cholesterol is 0.0, 7.0, and 72.9 percent, respectively.  
However, total cholesterol does not appear to be a strong predictor of diabetes: across the three 
categories, the prevalence of diabetes is 11.0, 7.4, and 10.5 percent, respectively.  Thus, LDL 
cholesterol can be somewhat inferred from total cholesterol, but plasma glucose and diabetes risk 
cannot. 
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III. Results 
  The empirical objective is to estimate whether new health information affects entitlement 
to DI or OA benefits.  Assuming random assignment, the effect is measured by the difference in 
entitlements between treatment and comparison groups after the survey.  To examine 
entitlements, entitlement rates are calculated by period years, defined as calendar years relative 
to the first calendar year of the survey.  For example, for the 1999/2000 survey, the first period 
year corresponds with calendar year 1999, and the second corresponds with calendar year 2000.  
Thus, the third period year is the first full calendar year after all survey respondents had 
participated in the survey.  The analysis is limited to four period years, since this period year for 
the 2003/2004 survey corresponds with calendar year 2006, the last year for which mortality data 
are available. 
A. Mortality 
 Before examining entitlements, it is necessary to examine whether subsequent rates of 
mortality differ between morning and afternoon examinees.  One reason is that health 
information may have a direct effect on mortality; another is that benefit entitlements are only 
defined for the non-deceased. 
 Figure 2 plots the percent deceased in by each period year, up to period year four, 
separately for morning and afternoon examinees.  As shown, the percent increases slightly across 
period years among both exam groups, but there is no apparent difference between groups.  By 
period four, the percent reaches 1.4 (standard error: 0.3) and 1.4 (standard error: 0.3) among 
morning and afternoon examinees, respectively.  The difference is not statistically significant.  
There is also no systematic difference in mortality outcomes between exam groups when 
examined across survey ages (not shown).  These results suggest that health information does not 
immediately affect mortality.  Thus, to simplify the analysis of entitlements, respondents who 
become deceased by period year four are omitted from the sample, removing 54 observations. 
B. Entitlements 
 The next step of the analysis is to examine different rates of benefit entitlement.  When 
rates of entitlement are plotted by period year, similar to Figure 2, there is no large difference in 
entitlement rates between exam groups (not shown).  However, noticeable differences in 
entitlement rates do arise when examined by survey age.  To illustrate these differences, Figure 3 
plots entitlement rates by period four separately by examination time and survey age.  As shown, 
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there is no consistent difference in entitlement rates at younger ages; however, at ages 59 to 62, 
entitlement rates are consistently lower among morning examinees.  While preliminary, these 
results suggest that new health information delays entitlements, particularly among older 
workers. 
C. Regression Framework 
  Although assignment to a morning examination is assumed random, differences in 
observable characteristics may arise between morning and afternoon examinees due to sampling.  
One concern is that these observable characteristics may account for the differences in 
subsequent entitlement rates between examination groups. 
 To address this concern, differences in entitlement rates are estimated using a regression 
framework.  This framework allows for estimating differences in entitlement rates between exam 
groups, while simultaneously controlling for observable differences between them.  The 
regression takes the following form: 
(1)             𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖. 
The outcome variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 indicates entitlement to either DI or OA benefits by period year four, 
equaling one if entitled and zero otherwise.  The variable 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 is an indicator of exam time, 
equaling one if the respondent is assigned to a morning examination and zero otherwise.  The 
vector 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 controls for observable characteristics between treatment and comparison groups, and 
may include demographic characteristics (Table 1), self-reported health characteristics (Table 2), 
and results from laboratory tests and examinations shared by morning and afternoon examinees 
(Table 3).  The error term is 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, which is specified to account for heteroskedasticity.  The 
coefficient of interest is 𝛽𝛽, which represents the difference in entitlement rates between morning 
and afternoon examinees by period year four. 
 The regression estimates for the analysis sample are presented in panel A of Table 4.  The 
panel contains three columns corresponding with different sets of control variables.  The first 
column contains no control variables.  As shown, the estimate of 𝛽𝛽 is negative, but small and 
statistically insignificant: -0.009 (standard error: 0.010).  This implies that new health 
information provided to morning examines decreased entitlements by period year four by 0.9 
percentage points.   
The second and third columns controls for observable characteristics that may differ 
between exam groups.  The second column contains controls for demographic characteristics and 
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self-reported health conditions; and the third column contains additional controls for laboratory 
test results.  As shown, these controls both increase the estimate of 𝛽𝛽 and decrease its standard 
error, resulting in statistically significant estimates.  The estimate in the third column suggests 
that additional health information provided to morning examinees decreased entitlements by 2.1 
percentage points. 
 According to Figure 3, the effect of health knowledge may vary by survey age.  To 
examine this possibility, the model is estimated using two mutually-exclusive age groups: 40 to 
58 and 59 to 62.  The estimates for the former group are presented in panel B of Table 4, and the 
estimates for the latter are presented in panel C of Table 4.  Similar to panel A, the three columns 
within each panel correspond to different sets of control variables. 
 As expected, the estimate of 𝛽𝛽 is small and statistically insignificant among younger 
workers, with or without control variables.  However, the estimate is large and statistically 
significant among older workers.    The estimate in column one panel C, which does not include 
control variable, suggests that new health information decreased entitlements by 9.8 percentage 
points.  This estimate increases to 11.4 percentage points in column three, which contains the full 
set of controls.  Thus, it appears that new health information leads to delays in benefit 
entitlements, particularly among older workers. 
 It is important to note that, within each panel, the size of the sample decreases from 
column one to three.  This is because some control variables are missing for some observations.  
To ensure that the different estimates of 𝛽𝛽 are not due to sample selection, 𝛽𝛽 is estimated with no 
control variables, but using only observations with non-missing values.  The estimates of 𝛽𝛽 are 
similar to those presented in column one of Table 4.  Among ages 40 to 62, the estimate is -0.007 
(standard error: 0.011); among ages 40 to 58, the estimate is -0.001 (standard error: 0.007); and 
among ages 59 to 62, the estimate is -0.130 (standard error: 0.043). 
 
IV. Additional Considerations 
 This section considers whether the delay in benefit entitlements varies across Social 
Security programs or across subgroups of the population.  This is accomplished by either 
replacing the outcome variable in equation (1), or by splitting the sample into subgroups.  In all 
regression specifications that follow, equation (1) contains the full set of control variables.  
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Additionally, the sample is limited to older workers who are ages 59 to 62 at the time of the 
survey.  
A. Type of Entitlement 
 Workers who are ages 59 to 62 at the time of the survey reach ages 62 to 66 by the end of 
period year four, when benefit entitlements are measured, and thus are eligible for OA benefits.  
An important consideration, then, is whether the delay in entitlements is due to DI benefits, OA 
benefits, or both.  To address this question, the outcome variable in equation (1) is replaced with 
program-specific indicators of entitlement.  The equation is estimated first using an indicator of 
DI entitlement by period year four and then again using an indicator of OA entitlement by period 
year four.  These indicators are based on initial entitlement, rather than the current entitlement at 
the end of period year four.4   
 The regression estimates are presented in panel A of Table 5.  The first column 
corresponds to DI entitlement, and the second column corresponds to OA entitlement.  As 
shown, additional health information decreases entitlements to both programs.  For DI, the 
estimated decrease is 3.8 percentage points, which is statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level.  For OA, the estimated decrease is 7.7 percentage points, which is not statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level (p-value: 0.064).  Thus, it appears that the delay in entitlements 
is greater for OA benefits, but the effect is less precisely estimated. 
B. Sex 
 According to Figure 1, rates entitlement increase near the early retirement age among 
both males and females.  Thus, another important consideration is whether the effect of new 
health information on benefit entitlements varies by sex.  To address this question, equation (1) 
is estimated separately for males and females.   
The results are presented in panel B of Table 5.  As shown, new health information 
appears to decrease claims among both males and females.  For males, the estimated decrease is 
13.1 percentage points, which is statistically significant at the five percent level.  For females, 
the estimated decrease is 10.8 percentage points, which is not statistically significant at the five 
percent level (p-value: 0.078).  Thus, the results suggest that the delay in entitlements is greater, 
and more precisely estimated, among males. 
4 Current entitlement differs from initial entitlement if a DI beneficiary reaches the normal 
retirement age, at which point the beneficiary is transferred to the OA program. 
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C. DI Insured Status 
  The next consideration is whether the effect of new health information varies by DI 
insured status.  To be insured, an individual must have accumulated 20 quarters of coverage 
during the past ten years.  Quarters of coverage are determined by a worker’s earnings that are 
covered by Social Security.  In 2013, one quarter of coverage is earned for every $1,160 in 
covered earnings, up to four quarters of coverage per calendar year.  DI insured status is 
determined for each survey respondent using longitudinal data on quarters of coverage contained 
in the SSA data.5  Of course, DI insured status determines whether a worker is eligible for DI 
benefits, but is also an indicator for recent labor force attachment.  To address this question, 
equation (1) is estimated separately by DI insured status. 
 The results are presented in panel C of Table 5.  As shown, the effect of new health 
information on benefit entitlements is only evident among worker who are DI insured.  Among 
these workers, the estimated decrease in entitlements is 13.5 percentage points, which is 
statistically significant at the five percent level.  Among workers who are not DI insured, the 
estimated decline is only 1.5 percentage points, which is not statistically significant.  Thus, it 
appears that the results are driven primarily by workers with recent attachment to the labor force. 
D. Previous Diagnosis of Diabetes 
 Mentioned above, diabetes status is the most salient difference in health information 
between exam groups.  An important consideration is whether the effect of health information 
depends on whether a respondent had been previously diagnosed with diabetes.  Ostensibly, a 
diabetes test – and a positive test result, in particular – provides more information to respondents 
who have not been previously diagnosed with diabetes.  To address this question, equation (1) is 
estimated for separately by whether the respondent had been previously diagnosed with diabetes 
according to the at-home survey. 
The estimates are presented in panel D of Table 5.  As shown, the effect of health 
information on delayed entitlements is greater among workers who have not been previously 
diagnosed.  Among these workers, the estimated decline in benefit entitlements is 12.7 
percentage points.  Among workers who had already been diagnosed with diabetes, the estimated 
decline in benefit entitlements is only 5.8 percentage points.  These results are consistent with a 
5 The administrative data do not contain annual Social Security covered earnings. 
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study by Edwards (2013), who finds that the effect of medical screening on health behaviors is 
greatest among the previously undiagnosed population. 
E. Quarters of Coverage 
 The final consideration is whether new health information affects labor supply.  Labor 
supply is measured using longitudinal data on quarters of coverage, which are available in the 
SSA administrative data.  To examine quarters of coverage, the outcome variable in equation (1) 
is replaced with two different measures of quarters of coverage.  The first measure is any 
quarters of coverage in period four; the second measure is the number of quarters of coverage in 
period year four. 
 The results are presented in Table 6.  Similar to Table 4, the results are presented for the 
entire analysis sample, and then separately for younger and older workers.  As shown, new 
health information appears to increase employment, but the effects are most pronounced among 
older workers.  Among these workers, the estimated increase in the likelihood of any quarters of 
coverage is 11.8 percentage points.  Among younger workers, the estimated increase is just 4.5 
percentage points.  These results suggest that health knowledge not only delays benefits 
entitlements, but increases labor supply as well.6 
   
V. Discussion and Conclusion 
 This study examines whether new health knowledge – obtained through medical 
screening – affect entitlements to Social Security benefits.  The results suggest that new health 
information increases labor supply and delays entitlements to benefits.  These results contrast 
with the general presumption that poor health hastens early retirement. 
 One possible mechanism is that the detection of a latent medical condition increases 
demand for health insurance coverage.  This increase in demand may encourage employment to 
obtain or retain employer provided health insurance coverage.  This mechanism is especially apt 
for workers who are not offered retiree health insurance, which is shown to significantly affect 
retirement behavior (Gruber and Madrian 1995).  The mechanism is also apt for workers under 
the age of 65, who may not qualify for Medicare. 
6 Coile et al. (2002) show that retirement does not perfectly coincide with timing of benefit 
entitlement. 
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 Support for this mechanism – and for the role of Medicare, specifically – is evident in 
Figure 3.  As mentioned, the effect of new health information on benefit delays is most apparent 
among older workers who are 59 to 62 years of age at the time of the survey.  However, among 
workers who are 62 years of age, the difference in entitlements is just 3.7 percentage points.  By 
the end of period year four, when entitlements are measured, these workers have reached ages 
64, 65, and 66, and thus a majority are eligible for Medicare.  Although this observation is by no 
means decisive – the sample sizes at a single age are too small to draw definitive conclusions – 
the figure suggests that new health information delays retirement specifically to age 65, when 
individuals become eligible for Medicare. 
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Appendix Table 1: Diagnostic Criteria 
Condition Criteria Morning Afternoon 
Diabetes, including borderline (plasma glucose) >100 mg/dL Yes No 
Diabetes (plasma glucose) >160 mg/dL Yes No 
High LDL cholesterol, including borderline >130 mg/dL Yes No 
High LDL cholesterol   >160 mg/dL Yes No 
Triglycerides, including borderline >150 Yes No 
Triglycerides >200 Yes No 
High total cholesterol, including borderline >200 mg/dL Yes No 
High total cholesterol >240 mg/dL Yes Yes 
Low HDL cholesterol <59 mg/dL Yes Yes 
High blood pressure 
>140/90 
mmHg Yes Yes 
Notes: The criteria for diabetes come from the National Institute of Diabetes, Digestive, and Kidney 
Diseases.  The criteria for cholesterol come from the National Heart, Blood, and Lung Institute.  In 
regards to the criteria for blood pressure, the numerator refers to systolic, and the denominator refers to 
diastolic. 
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 Figure 1: Percent of Survey Respondents Entitled to DI or OA Benefits Prior to the Survey 
 
Notes: The data come from the Continuous National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, years 
1999/2000, 2001/2002, and 2003/2004.  The sample is limited to respondents who are matched to SSA 
data. 
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 Figure 2: Mortality by Period Year, Analysis Sample 
 
Notes: Notes: The data come from the Continuous National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, 
years 1999/2000, 2001/2002, and 2003/2004.  The sample is limited to respondents who are matched to 
SSA data, who are not entitled to DI or OA benefits prior to the survey, and who are ages 40 to 62.  
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 Figure 3: DI or OA Entitlement by Period Year Four, Analysis Sample 
 
Notes: Notes: The data come from the Continuous National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, 
years 1999/2000, 2001/2002, and 2003/2004.  The sample is limited to respondents who are matched to 
SSA data, who are not entitled to DI or OA benefits prior to the survey, and who are ages 40 to 62.  
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Table 1: Demographic Characteristics 
 
Full Sample 
 
Analysis Sample 
  Morning Afternoon Difference   Morning Afternoon Difference 
Age (years) 50.0 49.5 0.534 
 
50.3 49.9 0.445 
 
(0.228) (0.226) (0.321) 
 
(0.155) (0.149) (0.216)* 
Male 0.473 0.475 -0.003 
 
0.491 0.493 -0.002 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.016) 
White 0.499 0.500 -0.002 
 
0.509 0.491 0.018 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.02) 
Other 0.195 0.192 0.003 
 
0.202 0.213 -0.012 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013) 
Black 0.306 0.308 -0.001 
 
0.289 0.295 -0.006 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.015) 
Less than High  0.329 0.326 0.003 
 
0.282 0.268 0.014 
     School (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) 
High School  0.235 0.240 -0.006 
 
0.221 0.232 -0.011 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.013) 
Some College or 0.436 0.433 0.003 
 
0.497 0.500 -0.003 
     More (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.016) 
Married 0.567 0.553 0.014 
 
0.662 0.651 0.011 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) 
Widowed 0.104 0.101 0.002 
 
0.037 0.031 0.006 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Divorced 0.119 0.124 -0.005 
 
0.177 0.184 -0.007 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013) 
Single 0.210 0.222 -0.012 
 
0.124 0.134 -0.010 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) 
        Observations 7270 6943     1925 1977   
Notes: The data come from the Continuous National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, years 
1999/2000, 2001/2002, and 2003/2004.  The full sample is limited to respondents who are ages 20 and 
older; the analysis sample is limited to respondents who are matched to SSA data, who are not entitled to 
DI or OA benefits prior to the survey, and who are ages 40 to 62.  Observations refer to the sample, and 
do not account for missing values for some variables.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  In the 
differences column, * indicates significance at the 5 percent level. 
Table 2: Self-Reported Health Characteristics 
 
Full Sample 
 
Analysis Sample 
  Morning Afternoon Difference   Morning Afternoon Difference 
        Diabetes, including 0.109 0.117 -0.008 
 
0.109 0.119 -0.010 
     borderline (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) 
Diabetes 0.097 0.102 -0.004 
 
0.095 0.105 -0.010 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) 
High cholesterol 0.273 0.257 0.016 
 
0.330 0.306 0.024 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007)* 
 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.0149) 
High blood pressure 0.319 0.316 0.003 
 
0.328 0.323 0.004 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) 
Arthritis 0.266 0.245 0.020 
 
0.255 0.225 0.029 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007)* 
 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.014)* 
Heart failure 0.034 0.031 0.003 
 
0.018 0.015 0.004 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Heart disease 0.042 0.047 -0.005 
 
0.029 0.026 0.003 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Angina 0.036 0.039 -0.003 
 
0.020 0.025 -0.005 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Heart attack 0.045 0.047 -0.002 
 
0.033 0.027 0.006 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Stroke 0.037 0.035 0.003 
 
0.018 0.015 0.004 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Emphysema 0.021 0.018 0.003 
 
0.015 0.008 0.007 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)* 
Overweight 0.290 0.291 -0.001 
 
0.354 0.352 0.002 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) 
Chronic bronchitis 0.061 0.059 0.002 
 
0.062 0.064 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
Liver condition 0.033 0.031 0.002 
 
0.045 0.046 0.000 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
        Observations 7270 6943     1925 1977   
Notes: The data come from the Continuous National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, years 
1999/2000, 2001/2002, and 2003/2004.  The full sample is limited to respondents who are ages 20 and 
older; the analysis sample is limited to respondents who are matched to SSA data, who are not entitled to 
DI or OA benefits prior to the survey, and who are ages 40 to 62.  Observations refer to the sample, and 
do not account for values for some variables.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  In the differences 
column, * indicates significance at the 5 percent level. 
Table 3: Laboratory and Examination Results 
 Full Sample  Analysis Sample 
  Morning Afternoon Difference   Morning Afternoon Difference 
Diabetes, including borderline 0.382 - -  0.439 - - 
 (0.006)    (0.012)   
Diabetes 0.099 - -  0.110 - - 
 (0.004)    (0.007)   
High LDL cholesterol,  0.375 - -  0.432 - - 
     including borderline (0.006)    (0.012)   
High LDL cholesterol   0.134 - -  0.158 - - 
 (0.004)    (0.009)   
Triglycerides, including  0.363 - -  0.376 - - 
     borderline (0.006)    (0.011)   
Triglycerides 0.203 - -  0.213 - - 
 (0.005)    (0.010)   
High total cholesterol,  0.496 0.517 -0.021  0.556 0.603 -0.046 
     including borderline  (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)*  (0.012) (0.011) (0.016)* 
High total cholesterol 0.173 0.184 -0.011  0.198 0.218 -0.019 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)  (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) 
Low HDL cholesterol 0.746 0.730 0.015  0.755 0.734 0.020 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) 
High blood pressure 0.224 0.215 0.009  0.202 0.206 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) 
BMI (index) 28.3 28.4 -0.074  29.1 29.2 -0.125 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.106)  (0.147) (0.147) (0.208) 
        
        
Observations 7270 6943     1925 1977   
Notes: The data come from the Continuous National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, years 
1999/2000, 2001/2002, and 2003/2004.  The full sample is limited to respondents who are ages 20 and 
older; the analysis sample is limited to respondents who are matched to SSA data, who are not entitled to 
DI or OA benefits prior to the survey, and who are ages 40 to 62.  Observations refers to the sample, and 
do not account missing values for some variables.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  In the differences 
column, * indicates significance at the 5 percent level. 
Table 4: Linear Probability Model of DI or OA Entitlement by Period Year, Analysis Sample 
 
A. Ages 40 to 62 
 
B. Ages 40 to 58 
 
C. Ages 59 to 62 
  (1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3) 
Morning -0.009 -0.020 -0.021 
 
-0.005 -0.007 -0.005 
 
-0.098 -0.105 -0.114 
 
(0.010) (0.010)* (0.010)* 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 
(0.040)* (0.039)* (0.042)* 
Age 
 
0.020 0.021 
  
0.003 0.003 
  
0.136 0.148 
  
(0.001)* (0.001)* 
  
(0.001)* (0.001)* 
  
(0.019)* (0.020)* 
Male 
 
0.020 0.017 
  
0.012 0.013 
  
0.049 0.048 
  
(0.010)* (0.010) 
  
(0.007) (0.007) 
  
(0.044) (0.045) 
Black 
 
0.019 0.024 
  
0.007 0.011 
  
0.007 0.005 
  
(0.013) (0.014) 
  
(0.010) (0.011) 
  
(0.058) (0.063) 
Other 
 
0.014 0.018 
  
0.001 -0.001 
  
-0.024 -0.014 
  
(0.012) (0.013) 
  
(0.009) (0.009) 
  
(0.051) (0.053) 
Less than High School 
 
0.014 0.014 
  
0.003 0.008 
  
0.017 0.032 
  
(0.015) (0.015) 
  
(0.011) (0.011) 
  
(0.059) (0.063) 
Some College or More 
 
-0.027 -0.025 
  
-0.010 -0.005 
  
-0.075 -0.069 
  
(0.012)* (0.012) 
  
(0.009) (0.009) 
  
(0.051) (0.054) 
Widowed 
 
-0.068 -0.061 
  
0.018 0.029 
  
-0.302 -0.303 
  
 
(0.032)* (0.036) 
  
(0.027) (0.031) 
  
(0.073)* (0.085)* 
Divorced 
 
-0.003 -0.004 
  
0.011 0.014 
  
-0.024 -0.038 
  
(0.013) (0.014) 
  
(0.010) (0.010) 
  
(0.057) (0.061) 
Single 
 
0.004 -0.005 
  
0.018 0.013 
  
-0.102 -0.126 
  
(0.014) (0.015) 
  
(0.012) (0.012) 
  
(0.080) (0.085) 
Self-Reported Health No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
Laboratory Results No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
            Observations 3848 3656 3282   3223 3063 2750   625 593 532 
Notes: The results are derived from the analysis sample.  The left-out categories are white, for race; high school diploma, for education; and 
married, for marital status.  Controls for self-reported health status refer to conditions listed in Table 2; controls for laboratory results refer to 
conditions listed in Table 3, excluding high HDL cholesterol, which is missing for a substantial number of observations.  Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses.  * and ** indicate significant at the five and one percent level, respectively. 
Table 5: Linear Probability of Benefit Entitlements, Analysis Sample 
 
A. Type of 
Entitlement 
 
B. Sex 
 
C. DI Insured Status 
 
D. Previous 
Diabetes Diagnosis 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
  DI OA   Male Female   Insured Not Insured   No Yes 
Morning -0.038 -0.077 
 
-0.131 -0.108 
 
-0.135 -0.015 
 
-0.127 -0.058 
 
(0.015)* (0.041) 
 
(0.059)* (0.061) 
 
(0.047)* (0.084) 
 
(0.046)* (0.108) 
Age -0.015 0.163 
 
0.193 0.132 
 
0.184 0.080 
 
0.155 0.095 
 
(0.008) (0.020)* 
 
(0.028)* (0.029)* 
 
(0.022)* (0.048) 
 
(0.023)* (0.063) 
Male 0.023 0.025 
    
-0.052 0.119 
 
0.062 -0.135 
 
(0.017) (0.045) 
    
(0.050) (0.101) 
 
(0.050) (0.140) 
Black -0.016 0.020 
 
-0.016 0.027 
 
0.041 0.044 
 
0.062 0.068 
 
(0.020) (0.063) 
 
(0.085) (0.098) 
 
(0.074) (0.139) 
 
(0.071) (0.194) 
Other -0.012 -0.001 
 
-0.063 0.042 
 
-0.032 0.034 
 
-0.031 0.149 
 
(0.016) (0.053) 
 
(0.071) (0.082) 
 
(0.058) (0.122) 
 
(0.060) (0.140) 
Less than High School 0.011 0.021 
 
0.198 -0.124 
 
0.106 -0.130 
 
0.041 -0.214 
 
(0.022) (0.063) 
 
(0.084)* (0.093) 
 
(0.073) (0.130) 
 
(0.071) (0.167) 
Some College or More -0.021 -0.048 
 
-0.032 -0.063 
 
-0.084 -0.164 
 
-0.068 -0.252 
 
(0.020) (0.054) 
 
(0.079) (0.077) 
 
(0.059) (0.129) 
 
(0.059) (0.167) 
Widowed -0.010 -0.293 
 
-0.123 -0.410 
 
-0.412 -0.160 
 
-0.304 -0.289 
  (0.010) (0.084)* 
 
(0.194) (0.096)* 
 
(0.098)* (0.175) 
 
(0.089)* (0.248) 
Divorced 0.019 -0.056 
 
0.089 -0.155 
 
-0.149 0.065 
 
-0.065 -0.030 
 
(0.026) (0.062) 
 
(0.095) (0.080) 
 
(0.073)* (0.117) 
 
(0.065) (0.148) 
Single -0.006 -0.120 
 
-0.120 -0.186 
 
-0.157 -0.066 
 
-0.129 -0.253 
 
(0.029) (0.084) 
 
(0.138) (0.116) 
 
(0.096) (0.176) 
 
(0.102) (0.215) 
            Observations 532 532   267 265   380 152   432 100 
Notes: The results are derived from the analysis sample.  The left-out categories are white, for race; high school diploma, for education; and 
married, for marital status.  All regressions include controls for self-reported health status (Table 2) and laboratory results (Table 3), excluding 
high HDL cholesterol, which is missing for a substantial number of observations.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  * and ** indicate 
significant at the five and one percent level, respectively. 
Table 6: Linear Models of Quarters of Coverage, Analysis Sample 
 
A. Any Quarters of Coverage 
 
B. Number of Quarters of Coverage 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
  Ages 40 to 62 Ages 40 to 58 Ages 59 to 62   Ages 40 to 62 Ages 40 to 58 Ages 59 to 62 
Morning 0.055 0.045 0.118 
 
0.215 0.159 0.557 
 
(0.015)* (0.016)* (0.042)* 
 
(0.061)* (0.066)* (0.165)* 
Age -0.014 -0.011 -0.081 
 
-0.055 -0.045 -0.302 
 
(0.001)* (0.002)* (0.021)* 
 
(0.005)* (0.007)* (0.085)* 
Male 0.096 0.090 0.102 
 
0.423 0.410 0.378 
 
(0.016)* (0.017)* (0.046)* 
 
(0.064)* (0.069)* (0.181)* 
Black -0.051 -0.055 0.034 
 
-0.216 -0.236 0.149 
 
(0.022)* (0.023)* (0.065) 
 
(0.088)* (0.093)* (0.257) 
Other 0.001 -0.007 0.077 
 
0.011 -0.015 0.294 
 
(0.020) (0.022) (0.055) 
 
(0.080) (0.086) (0.216) 
Less than High School -0.134 -0.134 -0.143 
 
-0.506 -0.501 -0.557 
 
(0.024)* (0.026)* (0.064)* 
 
(0.096)* (0.104)* (0.249)* 
Some College or More 0.034 0.020 0.083 
 
0.133 0.073 0.370 
 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.056) 
 
(0.076) (0.080) (0.223) 
Widowed 0.013 0.008 0.082 
 
0.074 0.062 0.301 
  (0.047) (0.056) (0.090) 
 
(0.187) (0.225) (0.351) 
Divorced 0.012 -0.006 0.098 
 
0.059 -0.014 0.429 
 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.062) 
 
(0.086) (0.092) (0.246) 
Single -0.004 -0.019 0.075 
 
-0.021 -0.071 0.251 
 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.079) 
 
(0.096) (0.101) (0.321) 
        Observations 3282 2750 532   3282 2750 532 
Notes: The results are derived from the analysis sample.  The left-out categories are white, for race; high school diploma, for education; and 
married, for marital status.  All regressions include controls for self-reported health status (Table 2) and laboratory results (Table 3), excluding 
high HDL cholesterol, which is missing for a substantial number of observations.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  * and ** indicate 
significant at the five and one percent level, respectively. 
